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Abstract
The Internet has become a necessity in today’s digital world, and making it secure is a
pressing concern. Hackers are investing ever-increasing efforts to compromise Internet
nodes with novel techniques. According to Forbes, every minute, $ 2,900,000 is lost
to cybercrime [39]. A common cyber-attack is Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, which may bring a network to a standstill, and
unless mitigated, network services could be halted for an extended period. The attack
can occur at any layer of the OSI model. This thesis focuses on SYN Flood DoS/DDoS
attacks, also known as TCP Flood attacks, and studies the use of artificial neural
networks to detect the attacks. Specific neural network models used in this thesis
are the Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), and
a semi-supervised model on label propagation. All neural network models detect
attacks by analyzing the individual hexadecimal values in the packet header. A
novelty of the approach followed in this thesis is that the neural networks do not
consider the lexical values of the network packet (MAC addresses, IP addresses, and
port numbers) as input features in their traffic analysis. Instead, the neural network
models are designed and trained to detect malicious traffic based on the time pattern
of TCP flags. The neural networks base their analysis of traffic on time-sequenced
patterns. An important hyperparameter discussed in this paper is the size of the
lookup window, that is, the number of past packets the model can access to predict
the next packet. Evaluation results based on datasets presented in this thesis show
that the accuracies of the GRU, CNN/LSTM, and label propagation models are 81%,
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Today’s society is highly dependent on the Internet for storing personal data, banking,
social media, online shopping, and more. Cybersecurity is more critical than ever in
today’s digital world. An adult spends 150 minutes on average just on social media.
Online is the new norm in this pandemic. Industries are in the process of migrating
to cloud computing to adapt to this disruption. Company spending on cloud-based
computing rose 37% to 29 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2020. FBI IC3 also
reported a 300% increase in the cybercrime reports since March’20. Cybersecurity is
not just prevalent in industries anymore but it has become a part of a common man’s
life as well.
Cyber-attacks have negative impacts on business as well as personal lives. It leads
to loss of intellectual property and loss of trust from consumers in the business world.
Individuals also suffer from the misuse of personal information like banking details,
contact information, and pictures. Denial of Service attacks is one of the common
attacks used to disrupt the network. It is potentially one of the most dangerous
attacks because a DoS attack on the network, if not mitigated, causes the service
to stop for an indeterminate period. Detecting DoS and DDoS attacks in a timely
fashion and keeping the network secure is the motivation behind this research.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Detection and mitigation of denial of service attacks have many challenges like
the attack is diverse across all the OSI layers, the complexity of the attack varies,
for DDoS, the attack is originating from multiple sources, manual intervention is
required at periodic intervals, and granular control on all the services is challenging.
The precautionary methods used in the industry are designing a DDoS response plan,
keeping a tab on the network traffic in the system, following cyber wellness, securing
network endpoints, and dial-in firewalls. In case of an attack, the network traffic is





Cybersecurity is about identifying the malicious intent of the attacker and taking the
necessary steps to secure and minimize the consequences if the system is attacked.
Cybersecurity is the need of the times as cyber threats are increasing in today’s digital
world. Without the Internet, the world would stop. The 2020 pandemic is the best
example of the need for secure systems and the importance of the Internet. Research
shows that humans generate 319.6 billion emails per day, 4,444.65 billion Whatsapp
messages, and 500 hours of content added every minute on YouTube. According
to Statista, it is estimated that 74 zettabytes of data will be created in 2021, and
there is an upward trend shown for this number in the coming years. In the era
of global connectivity where industries are shifting towards cloud computing to run
their services and store personal data, unaware of their personal cyber and network
security, along with the sophisticated modern tools for an attack increases the chances
of a malicious attack on an organization.
There are a variety of motivating factors for attackers to carry out cyber attacks.
Financial gain is not the attacker’s only motive. Some strikers want to make their
point in front of a large audience, while others may want to show their strength and
take revenge on their competitors.
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The motivations behind a cyber attack may be one of the following:
• Financial Gain
To have monetary gain from stealing valuable data like banking passwords and
credit card information.
• Make a Social/Political Statement
To advocate for an individual point of view or the point of view of a group of
people, socially or politically to gain ground.
• Fun Hackerism
It is performed for fun, adrenaline, people’s attention.
• Exploiting Business
To exploit competitors’ business and cause disruptions and reputational dam-
age.
• Cyberwarfare
Some of the most common cyberattacks are:
• Denial of service attack (DoS)
This attack floods server or network bandwidth with invalid network traffic.
This leads to the depletion of system resources and the inability of legitimate
users of the network to perform their valid tasks. There can be multiple attack-
ers or compromised devices that an attacker can use to increase the severity of
an attack known as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. This study
focuses on the TCP SYN flood attack.
• Man in the middle attack (MitM)
As the name suggests, network traffic is ”eavesdropped on” and attackers act




This attack aims to exploit the vulnerability of the system after it is detected
and a security patch is still to be delivered by the vendor. The vendors need to
be constantly testing and securing their systems to avoid such attacks.
• Malware
Malicious email attachments and links to install unidentified software that in-
cludes viruses, worms, and spyware are the prime methods to exploit vulnera-
bilities of the system. Once the malware is inside the system, it can perform
various tasks like stealing data from the drive, disrupting essential services,
installing other malware, and more.
Phishing, SQL injection, DNS tunneling, cross-site scripting (XSS) are a few other
cyber attacks.
A few of the major cyberattacks in the past decade are:
• LinkedIn (June 2021)
The data of 700 million users was leaked on the dark web. Attackers exploited
vulnerabilities in the service APIs to obtain email addresses, phone numbers,
and other social media information contained on the platform.
• Twitter (July 2020)
The attackers used phone phishing and social engineering techniques to ob-
tain employee logins to hijack accounts of some prominent personalities on the
Internet. They were able to scam bitcoins worth $100,000
• Sina Weibo (March 2020)
Database of 538 million Weibo users was leaked on the dark web that included
details like name, gender, location, and phone number.
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• Facebook (April 2019)
Facebook admitted that two datasets from their apps were exposed to the public
internet. This affected 530 million Facebook users. The data was posted free of
cost in 2021 by the attacker.
• Marriott International (Sept 2018)
Marriott learned from an investigation that there was unauthorized access
to their company network since 2014, and the attacker had copied the guest
database staying there. Marriott International had to pay 18.4 million pounds
by the UK government.
• 2017 WannaCry Ransomware Cyber Attack
This was one of the largest ransomware attacks affecting systems in about 150
countries, losing £6 billion in global revenue during the attack.
2.2 Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an attack directed to stop genuine users to access
a machine or service on a network. Thus the attacker stops the timely and regular
network flow by performing a DoS attack. The services that may be attacked are
websites, banking, cloud-based computing et cetra. Performing a DoS attack can
lead to a massive financial loss if the services are time-sensitive like e-commerce.
Companies try to implement DoS protection in the network because this attack would
cost them precious time and money if their network or servers are down for public
use. DoS attacks can be classified broadly into three types namely, Volumetric attack,
Protocol attack, and Application layer attack.
Volumetric Attack : This attack consists of sending a very large amount of traffic
to the victim with the aim of consuming all the bandwidth and creating congestion.
7
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The amount of incoming traffic overwhelms the network and a near zero bandwidth
is available for the genuine traffic, leading to a denial of service. Volumetric attacks
are either reflective or non-reflective in nature. In a reflective attack, the attacker
sends small size packets to services like Domain Name Server (DNS) or Network Time
Protocol (NTP) disguised as coming from the victim. The small requests or queries
as they are called, sent to the DNS in return receives large answers, and since the
recipient is forged as the victim, this traffic is sent to its network. Non-reflective
attacks are performed with the assist of botnets. Using a large army of botnets, each
bot sends small packets at a very high rate to the victim. DNS Amplification, ICMP
flood, and UDP flood are a few examples of volumetric attacks.
Protocol Attack : Protocol attack in general deals with the inadequacies of layer
3 and layer 4 of the OSI model i.e Network and Transport layer. The purpose of this
attack is to overwhelm the open state tablespace of the devices in these layers so that
they won’t have proper forwarding operation. The network services work in a FIFO
queue and thus the first request that arrives has to be completed to move to the next
one. In a DoS attack, this queue becomes so long due to constant incoming requests
that the computer resources aren’t enough to handle each request. SYN Flood and
Ping of Death are a few examples of protocol attacks. TCP SYN Flood attack is
discussed in depth in section 3.
Application Attack : The Application layer is the 7th layer of the OSI model.
Attacking the application includes an attack on layers 5 through 7 in the OSI model
and vulnerable protocols are HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SMTP to name a few. Common
Application layer attacks include HTTP Flooding, Slowloris, and BGP Hijacking.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are a subset of DoS attacks. In
DDoS attacks, there are multiple attackers to one victim. They are collectively known
as “botnet”. The difference between DoS and DDoS can be tabulated as,
8
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Table 2.1: Comparison between DoS and DDoS
Parameters DoS DDoS
Number of Attackers Single Multiple
Location of Attacker Single Multiple
Traffic Volume Sent Less than DDoS More than DoS
Detecting the attacker Easy Difficult
Mitigation Easy Difficult
Efficency of Attack Moderate High
Figure 2.1: Differeny Types of DDoS attacks [17]
DDoS attacks have started to become an everyday occurrence. Cisco predicted
the total number of DDoS attacks will rise from 7.9 million in 2018 to around 15
million in 2023. The rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) has given researchers a
tough time to manage the security of these devices. The ease with which one can
install malware on the cheap hardware used in them is a reason to be skeptical about
using them in day to day life. 20.4 billion IoT devices were online in 2020 and this
number is expected to rise to 75 billion devices by 2025 [5]. Creating a bot army,
botnet, would be easy if the security of these devices is ignored by the manufacturers
as well as the consumers.




Amazon Web Services was hit by a DDoS attack in 2020, which lasted for three
days, and the traffic sent to the victim was measured to be 2.3 terabytes per second.
The attacker used Connectionless Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Reflection
to attack the third-party servers. Knowing that AWS has the highest percentage of
shares when it comes to providing cloud computing services, we can imagine how the
implications of a DDoS attack on the world.
GitHub DDoS Attack
This attack was found to be sending packets at the rate of 126.9 million packets
per second. The attacker was amplifying the attack via a database cache system
called Memcached by flooding them with spoofed requests.
The Dyn Attack
Mirai malware was used in this attack. This malware was installed on compro-
mised IoT devices. Dyn being a DNS provider, various services like Airbnb, Netflix,
Visa were affected in this attack which lasted for a day.
2.3 Algorithms
This section includes the background on the machine learning algorithms used in
the research. Understanding the fundamentals behind the gates in LSTM and GRU
would facilitate a better understanding of their performance. Also, the mechanism
behind the propagation of labels in semi-supervised learning would help in its imple-
mentation.
2.3.1 Neural Networks
The neural networks are designed to recognize patterns and are generally modeled
after the human brain. They translate sensory information using a variety of machine
learning, labeling, or clustering of raw data. The patterns they recognize are quan-
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titative and are encoded in vectors, into which all real-world information, whether
images, audio, text, or experience series, must be read. The neural network consists
of layers of nodes that are either fully or partially connected and are used to perform
tasks such as classifying objects, identifying people, and predicting future events.
In the neural network model, the fundamental building block is the neuron. It re-
ceives input and then applies mathematical functions, known as activation functions,
to produce an output. The neural network model’s inputs are weighted. The weights
represent the neuron’s strength. The greater the weight, the greater the influence of
that neuron on the outcome. From fig 2.2, w1 and w2 are the weight assigned to x1
and x2, respectively
Figure 2.2: 2-input Neuron
(x1 ∗ w1) + (x2 ∗ w2) + b
is the input to the activation function
11
Chapter 2. Background
The output to the neuron is given by,
y = f((x1 ∗ w1) + (x2 ∗ w2) + b)
The activation function, also known as the transfer function, is used to introduce
nonlinearity. Because the neural network model’s linear layers produce linear output,
the activation function is a necessary addition to the model.
A few of the activation used in this research are,
Sigmoid Function





From the fig 2.3, sigmoid is not centered zero and this hinders the performance









Tanh acivation function is centered at zero and provides advantage over the sig-
moid function. The output ranges from (-1,1)
Rectified Linear Unit (RELU)
Figure 2.5: Sigmoid Activation Function
13
Chapter 2. Background
f(x) = max(0, x) (2.3)
RELU gives output zero if the input is zero or less than zero. For input values
higher than zero this activation function’s output mimics the input values. Tanh
does not suffer from vanishing gradient problem. Backpropagation is used in a neural
network to find the gradient values in all the layers. Derivatives are calculated at
each layer and multiplied down the network to find the gradient of the first layer. A
smaller value to the derivative will not help in updating the gradient for the initial
layer. This is known as the vanishing gradient problem, and it has an impact on the
model’s overall accuracy.
Figure 2.6: Fully Connected Neural Network
The fig 2.6 shows a fully-connected neural network model with a 1-hidden layer.




2.3.2 Convolutional Neural Network
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is a deep learning algorithm mainly used for
an image as an input. CNN can learn the characteristics of the features by applying
concepts like filters and pooling. CNN captures the spatial and temporal dependencies
of the dataset using these concepts with considerably lower preprocessing required.
CNN performs better than a fully connected network due to fewer parameters involved
and a better understanding of the feature space. This research uses CNN with the
LSTM to achieve lower time to train the model and better accuracy than the sole
LSTM model.
Figure 2.7: Convolutional Neural Network
CNN employs pooling layers, which are in charge of reducing the number of input
features using various methods. The most common pooling methods are maximum
pooling and average pooling. The objective of the CNN is to extract the high-level
features. The filter, also known as the kernel, is a ’n * n’ square matrix that slides
across the feature set and extracts the information.
2.3.3 Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
Forgetting essential information, in the long run, is the problem faced by many natural
language algorithms. RNNs are used to tackle this problem. In RNNs, the result
is fed back into itself. Thus, RNNs depend on the previous state in the training
model to predict the final output. The internal memory present in the RNN helps
15
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it to remember important detail of the feature while learning. RNNs are well-suited
to predicting results based on time series, text, and any other data that relies on
previous samples to forecast future ones.
Figure 2.8: Result fed back in the node
Consider a simple stream, with the input sequence [1, 4, B, F, 5, 9, 0, A, A, ...
]. From the sequence, at step t = 0, input value is 1, and at step t = 1, the input
value is 4 and so on. The Feedforward Neural Network will take the input and predict
the output based on the current input value. From the figure, the RNN takes the
current value and the previous input value to predict the result. In above example,
the sequence at t = 2, x0 = B and t = 3, x1 = F will together help in predicting the
next result of the sequence
16
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Figure 2.9: RNN Feedback Loop
2.3.4 Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) Network
LSTMs are a special kind of RNNs. They are capable of learning long-term depen-
dencies. LSTMs can remember information over a long period. As seen in the RNN
block diagram, there is a single tanh layer, but in LSTM, four layers consisting of
tanh and sigmoid function are connected in a specific fashion.
Figure 2.10: LSTM block diagram
The cell state, represented by the horizontal line running through the top of the
block diagram, aids in preserving information over time with minor changes. LSTM
functions using three gates to control the cell state. Sigmoid function output ranges
(0, 1). In LSTM, the sigmoid layer directly connected to the cell state is also referred
to as the ”forget layer”.
17
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ft = σ(Wf .[ht−1, xt] + bf ) (2.4)
xt is the input at time-step ”t” and ht−1 is the output from the previous state ”t− 1”
passes through this layer, and decides whether it will affect the cell state (sigmoid
layer output ”1”) or disregard it completely (sigmoid layer output ”0”)
The next gate is a combination of a sigmoid layer and a tanh layer. It decides
what new information is to be stored in the cell state.
it = σ(Wi.[ht−1, xt] + bi)Ct = tanh(WC .[ht−1, xt] + bC) (2.5)
The old state Ct−1 is updated with the new state Ct. By multiplying ft to the
old state and adding Ct * it we update the values.
Ct = ft ∗ Ct−1 + it ∗ Ct) (2.6)
Thus vector created by this gate and the result of the ”forget layer” together
update the cell state.
Finally, the updated cell state and the input go through the final step to produce
an output which is forwarded to the next LSTM block.
ot = σ(Wo.[ht−1, xt] + bo)ht = ot ∗ tanh(Ct) (2.7)
2.3.5 Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) Network
Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) is another fascinating neural network that aids in solv-
ing vanishing gradient problems like LSTM. Unlike LSTM, GRU has only two gates
- update gate and reset gate. These gates decide how much information will be
transmitted to the GRU affecting the cell state.
The update gate decides the amount of past information to add to the current
18
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cell state and preserve for the future.
Figure 2.11: GRU block diagram
The fig 2.11 shows that the update gate output zt at time step ”t” is given by,
zt = σ(W
ux ∗ xt +W uh ∗ ht−1) (2.8)
W ux and W uh are the weights associated with the input xt and ht−1 respectively.
Sigmoid gives the output value between 0 and 1. This gate can be managed to provide
all the past information.
rt = σ(W
rx ∗ xt +W rh ∗ ht−1) (2.9)
The reset gate is used to decide the amount of past information to forget and not
influence the cell state. The output of the reset gate is given by rt. The mathematical
representation is the same as for the update gate. The inputs to this sigmoid function
differ in their individual weights
2.3.6 Semi-Supervised Learning
A machine learning model needs a dataset to train and learn. With supervised learn-
ing algorithms, the dataset used is of ’labeled’ form i.e the final label for each sample
19
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is known. With unsupervised learning algorithms, the model is trained to detect
the pattern and categorize the data. The datasets used in unsupervised learning are
unlabeled.
Semi-supervised learning uses a small amount of labeled data and a large amount
of unlabeled data. Semi-supervised is a combination of supervised learning and un-
supervised learning models.
A semi-supervised learning algorithm works on the following assumption made
about the data:
Smoothness Assumption The data points located closer to each other are often
likely to have the same output label
Cluster Assumption After clustering the data into discrete groups, the data
point in the same group will often have the same class.
Low-density Assumption The decision boundary lies in a low-density region
Manifold Assumption The data lie approximately on a manifold of a much
lower dimension than the input space. This assumption helps in using the labeled
and unlabeled data together and avoids the problem with higher dimensionality.
2.3.6.1 Self-Training
This semi-supervised learning algorithm takes a small amount of labeled data and
trains the model to detect the labels for the unlabeled dataset. The unlabeled data
goes through numerous iterations and data satisfying a specific probability is given a
pseudo-label and used to detect other unlabeled data.
Figure 2.12 shows the flow of the self training model and the steps to create
pseudo labels for the unlabeled data.
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Figure 2.12: Self-training Model Flowchart
2.3.6.2 Label Propagation
Label Propagation Algorithm (LPA) is a quick method of analyzing the data and
creating communities in a network. The random walk and clamping are used to
propagate labels. Unlabeled data receive labels from labeled data, which acts as a
source. The algorithm learns about the individual communities in the network based
on the Euclidean distance.
LPA functions by spreading labels throughout the network and generating com-
munities based on this process.
The technique is based on the idea that a single label may quickly become dom-
inant in a densely linked group of nodes, but that it would struggle to traverse a
sparsely connected zone. Labels will get trapped inside a tightly linked set of nodes,
and nodes that have the same label once the algorithms are completed can be regarded
as members of the same community.
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Figure 2.13: Label Propagation
Let x1, x2, x3....xt be the input and y1, y2, ...yt be the labeled data. Also, (xt+1, yt+1),
(xt+2, yt+2)....(xt+u, yt+u) be the unlabeled data. Label propagation with the help of
transductive learning transfers labels to the unlabeled nodes.
Based on the assumption of semi-supervised learning, close data points have sim-
ilar labels. By creating a network based on the data, and weights are assigned to the
edges connecting these nodes. Closer the data, the larger the weight. The weights








All the nodes have soft labels assigned to them. Larger weights allows the label
to propagate much easier. T is the probabilistic transition matrix.






Tij is the probability to of the label to jump from node j to i
2.4 Related Work
R. Sahu et al. [1] showed the effect of SYN flooding on CPU utilization and memory.
The utilization shows a rising curve changing from 10% to 90% in less than 5 ms,
causing other nodes in the network to suffer to link the afflicted node. U. Dincalp
et al. [2] studied the DoS attack (ICMP flooding) and used the DBSCAN clustering
algorithm. DBSCAN algorithm is a method used for clustering large datasets con-
taining many features with noise sensitivity. A few of the features included in the
dataset are incoming packet rate, the total size of the ICMP packet, record time and
number of packets in an interval. S. Wankhede et al. [3] used the CIC IDS 2017
dataset focusing on the Slowloris and HTTP flood attacks. They concluded that
the random forest algorithm provides higher accuracy than the MLP algorithm for
detection of malicious packets using 84 features. The research future work includes
classify different types of DoS attack in a single dataset. T. Abhiroop et al. [4] dis-
cuss the effect of DoS attack on the TCAM memory in SDN, they considered the
average number of packets per flow, an average number of bytes as a few of their
features. Applying neural network, SVM, and Naive Bayes method, they concluded
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that neural network and naive Bayes provides 100% accuracy in detecting the DoS
attack. They also concluded that training time for neural network is considerably less
than that of Naive Bayes. S. Gunduz et al. [5] focused their interest on DoS attack
on wireless sensor networks. Similarly, K. Wehbi et al. [6] did a survey on the perfor-
mance of machine learning algorithms on DDoS attacks specifically for IoT systems.
They had 2 distinct feature sets used for training and compared their results. They
implemented SVM, KNN and RF algortihms for the detrection. A. Yusof et al. [7]
used an adaptive learning algorithm to select the most relevant features related to
the DDoS attack. Consistency subset evaluation (CSE) and DDoS characteristics fea-
tures (DCF) were used in combination for the adaptive feature selection. S. Dongre
[8] et al. also focused on analyzing the feature selection techniques for DoS attacks
ranking the feature sets based on the information gain, gain ratio, and correlation
parameters. M. Meyer et al. [9] use mathematical theories like Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence and Hausdorff difference along with machine learning techniques to develop
a intrusion detection system. R. Zebari et al. [10] compared the impact of HTTP
and SYN Flood DDoS attacks on the Apache 2 and IIS webservers. M. Bogdanoski
et al. [11] analyzed the vulnerabilities of TCP, specifically when the SYN flag is on
using OPNET simulation environment. B. Hartpence et al. [12] performed packet
classification and compare different optimization techniques to reduce training time
and obtain higher accuracy on a balanced dataset. They used neural network model





The primary objective of this research is to build a generalized model that would
work for DoS/DDoS detection in a real-time scenario. As the network traffic is highly
unpredictable, and machine learning algorithms can only work with similar data that
they have seen during the training, using lexical features of network packet won’t
be impactful for the objective of this research. The lexical features of the network
packets like MAC addresses, IP addresses, and Port numbers are eliminated from the
feature list. The model is trained to predict the next network packet based on the
pattern of the incoming traffic flow.
The network traffic dataset available to the public hinders the problem state-
ments researchers want to solve. This thesis focuses on the raw hex values of the
network packet as an input to the neural network model. Because the current dataset
has multiple flaws, customized datasets are created to collect various patterns for
DoS/DDoS attack network traffic. The labels are based on the TCP flags. These
datasets are used to train the models based on GRU, CNN/LSTM, and the Label
Propagation model.
A look-back window of size ’n’ is the block that includes ’n’ consecutive packets.
This block is utilized as a neural network’s input. The goal of stacking the network
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packets as one input rather than a single network packet as input to the RNNs is to
allow the model to recognize differences in the pattern of a group of network packets.
3.2 Problems With Existing Network Traffic Datasets
The majority of the network traffic dataset available to the public, table 3.1, are
either outdated or irrelevant to the problem statement researchers want to solve. The
objective of this research focuses on the detection of malicious packets in a Denial
of Service attack based on the pattern of the incoming network traffic. Some of the










Table 3.1: Some publicly available network traffic datasets
The related work discussed before in section 2.4, the researchers used these files
as a set of static features that contain human-readable values such as the complete
IP address, MAC address, and port number as shown in the fig 3.1.
Other datasets mention the time rate when the attack is under the system and
requires preprocessing the data for further use. Most time intervals for these attacks
26
Chapter 3. Methodology
Figure 3.1: Snippet from a Network Traffic Dataset on Kaggle
are not well documented and labeling such network traffic can be very tedious. Using
such a dataset hampers the scope of the problem statement of the research. Another
issue with these records is the accuracy of the labeling. The labeling method does
not match the quality and scope of the data. Human-dependent labeling is better
for better accuracy, but one can’t sanely label millions of samples in a single dataset.





Datasets were created for this project from a personalized testbed hosted through
Docker containers. A dockerfile and a docker-compose.yaml file include all the network
information required to host the testbed. The network topology include 3 instances
namely victim, bystander and attacker as shown in the fig 3.2. Tcpdump is running
on the “victim” to capture network traffic. The “bystander” sends a file of size
1 Gb to the victim using the netcat (nc) tool on the port opened by the victim for
communication. The victim port is listening for multiple connections. For performing
DoS/DDoS attack, Low Orbit Ion Cannon tool and hping3 is used. Different network
traffic dumps are generated by using different rate of packet flooding from the attacker.
The results obtained are for 700 µs, 800 µs, 1000 µs and 5000 µs packet delay i.e for
700 µs, the attacker waits for 700 microseconds before sending the next TCP-SYN
packet. Fig 3.3 shows an DoS attack in progress.
Figure 3.2: Network Topology
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Figure 3.3: Denial of Service attack hosted in Docker containers
Google Colab [38] was used to run the models implemented in this research. The
hardware and operating system used for all the models are identical. Table 3.2 shows
the hardware specification of the Google Colab service.
Operating System Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS
Processor Intel(R) Xeon(R)
GPU Frequency 0.82GHz / 1.59GHz
GPU Memory 12 GB
Performance 4.1 TFLOPS / 8.1
TFOLDS
No. of CPU Cores 2
CPU Family Haswell
RAM 12GB
Graphics NVIDIA Tesla K80










Table 3.3: Python Packages
Models are generated and tested in Python 3.7.6 environment. The libraries and
packages used are given in table 3.3
3.4 Datasets
The captured network traffic is preprocessed by passing it into a parser, programmed
in Python, to create a dataset that handles categorical data; good and malicious
packets are provided with labels. The labels are based on the combinations of TCP
flag present in the packet. The labels are represented numerically as shown in table
3.4
Bad TCP - SYN 0
Good TCP - SYN 1
Bad TCP - SYN/ACK 2
Good TCP - SYN/ACK 3
Bad TCP - RST/ACK 4
Good TCP - RST/ACK 5
TCP - ACK 6
TCP - FIN/ACK 7
Table 3.4: Labels for different combination of TCP Flags
The parser programmatically separates the malicious and benign network traffic.
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This is necessary to build a labeled dataset that can be fed into the neural network
model. This parser allows you to dynamically configure the number of hexadecimal
values to extract from the packet.
Network throughput is the amount of data transfer from a source to a destination









Figures below show the throughput graph for Denial of Service attack performed
with varied rates. The figure 3.4 shows that the throughput of the file transfer from
the ”bystander” to ”victim” suffers drastically as the DoS attack is under progress.
For binary classification, labels 0.0, 4.0, 2.0 are combined together as ”0.0” and other
labels are added to ”1.0”. Thus using ”0.0” as malicious and ”1.0” as benign packets
in the binary classification.















Table 3.6: Binary Labels for ”700 us”
dataset
Increasing the rate of DoS attack will decrease the throughput of the file transfer
as shown in the figure 3.5. There are a couple of bursts in the throughput indicating
the rate of DoS attack at 2 points was low enough to get higher benign file transfer
rate. Table 3.5 and table 3.6 provides the count of labels for multiclass and binary
class of the dataset respectively.















Table 3.8: Binary Label Count for ”800
us” dataset
Figure 3.6 shows the throughput of the benign file transfer when the system is
under a DoS attack with the rate of 1000 us.















Table 3.10: Binary Label Count for
”1000 us” dataset
Figure 3.7: Throughput of the file transfer in the DDoS7 dataset
Figure 3.7 shows the throughput graph when the system is under a DDoS attack.
The bystander is completing multiple TCP 3-way handshakes successfully. This gen-
erates a unique pattern for incoming network traffic.
Figure 3.8 shows the throughput graph when the system is under a DDoS attack.
The attacker spoofs the IP address and send the victim malicious packets from 3
different IP address. This approach is more severe than the DoS attack, since the




















3.5 Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 - Approaches
Table 3.13, table 3.14 and table 3.15 show the individual parameters that make the
ethernet header, IP header and the TCP header. This parameters acts as the features
in the models used for this research.
Ethernet Frame
Bits
Destination MAC Address 48
Source MAC Address 48
Type [0x8870 (Ethertype)] 16




HLEN [IP Header Length] 4




Time to live 8
Protocol 8
Checksum 16
Source IP Address 32
Destination IP Address 32
Table 3.14: Fields presents in IP header
TCP SYN Flood attack focuses on the 3-way TCP Handshake that is the core of
the TCP connection building, and thus the research is focused on this attack. The
raw data of the packet, consisting of hex characters, are the proposed features to the























Table 3.15: Fields present in the TCP header
First, consider both the header as well the payload. The other possible method is to
use the header only, either whole or a part of it. The reason for not utilizing the entire
payload content is the additional variance introduced by this information, which also
does not help the model to learn anything important. In addition, the neural network
model might take more time to process additional nodes. Using all the content from
the header will help get a better view of the network. Fig 3.11 shows a packet capture
where the green block includes the header and the red block includes the data hex




Figure 3.9: Parameters in the Ethernet and IP header
Figure 3.10: Parameters in the TCP header
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Figure 3.11: Packet capture in Wireshark
SYN Flood attack is performed using the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) tool,
hping3; and nping is used for generating specific benign packets. The TCP handshake
is the procedure that the attacker takes advantage of. The attacker keeps on sending
SYN packets to the victim, without sending the ACK which shows that the port is
still not connected but the attacker wants to connect to it. The attacker’s flooding
technique overwhelms all the ports and no other genuine users can transfer data to
the victim. Fig 3.12 shows the difference in a successful TCP 3-way handshake and
malicious TCP-SYN Flooding.
Figure 3.12: TCP 3-way Handshake and TCP SYN Flood sequence
The Python coded parser is included in the Appendix section
The preprocessed CSV files can be used in three different approaches,
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All the lexical features of the packets are removed i.e Source and Destination IP
addresses, Source MAC and Destination MAC address, and Port numbers are removed
as features and the model is trained on the remaining features. This approach is called
the ”Type 1” approach.
In other approach, the Source MAC and Destination MAC address, and Port
numbers are removed as the features. IP addresses are included for the model to
trained on. It is also known as the ”Type 2” approach.
The ”Type 3” approach includes all lexical features from the packet in the feature
list i.e all 98 bytes are considered for the model to trained on. These 98 bytes include
the headers along with a part of the data.
Because real-time network traffic is highly unpredictable, supervised learning al-
gorithms that use IP addresses and MAC addresses as features will predict the out-
come based on these lexical features of the packet. As a result, these models can
only be used in real-time traffic if the network traffic originates from the trained IP
addresses and MAC addresses. Type 1 is used to create a generalized model that
learns from the pattern of incoming network traffic. This model will not rely on the
IP address or MAC address to detect a DoS attack and can thus be used in a real-
world scenario at data centers. Type 2 and Type 3 models are trained using lexical
features, and their performance is compared to that of the Type 1 models.
Fig 3.13, fig 3.14 and fig 3.15 provides better understanding of this approaches.
Let’s take the examples of a postcard delivery with respect to the receiver. The
receiver has a table that maps all the valid MAC addresses and IP addresses
Type 1 - No lexical features The postcard has a valid destination but no informa-
tion on the source. Thus, the receiver won’t exactly know the source address where
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this packet is coming from. But the receiver knows that valid sender always sends
letters in a particular fashion, in our case SYN, SYN-ACK and ACK and so on. Type
1 model training is based on this phenomenon and shown in fig 3.13.
Figure 3.13: Type 1 approach
With Type 2, source address is provided i.e MAC addresses. Now the receiver
knows where the letter is coming from, but not the name of the sender shown in fig
3.14. Still, the model should be able to find the validity of the packets based on
the MAC address alone and devise a solution to block the packets from this address.
The model will not work if the MAC address of the attacker changes as the model
doesn’t recognize the new address as harmful. The receiver intelligence is based on
the situation it faces. The machine learning model can only give accurate results for
the data they have seen before.
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Figure 3.14: Type 2 approach
With Type 3, the source address and the name of the sender is provided with
additional information i.e MAC, IP, and Port all provided. This behavior of this
model will be similar to that of Type 2, as the model gets trained on the lexical
features rather than the sequence of the incoming packets shown in fig 3.15.




Training the model based on individual network packets won’t work in this scenario
as the Denial of Service Attack network traffic can’t be differentiated from the benign
network based on single packet content. As shown in fig 3.12, a minimum of three
packets is required to distinguish the pattern of a TCP handshake and malicious
TCP-SYN Flood. Since the research focuses on eliminating the lexical features of
the packet for training, time sequence or the sequence of incoming packets is the
parameter to consider. TCP flags are a significant feature that contributes to the
prediction along with the packet sequence.
An array of an ’n’ consecutive packets is created using the ’n’ sized look-back
window. Each of these arrays is fed into the model to train and predict the label of
the next packet shown in the fig 3.16. The window size is an important parameter
to configure as this size will decide how many network packets the model can look
back to while predicting the next one. The window size will also affect the memory
utilization of the model since large window sizes will take more space and time in
training.
Figure 3.16: Window creation for size n = 5
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The flow of network traffic would vary dramatically depending on the rate of
the DoS/DDoS attacks. A high-rate attack would disrupt the entire network, and
traffic captured at the victim would show only failed TCP handshakes because the
bandwidth would be flooded with Bad TCP SYNs from the attacker. Similarly, if the
attack rate is lower than the benign file transfer rate, we get a traffic capture with a
few good packets interspersed between the malicious packet flows, and the model is
trained on such an attack pattern.
The size of the window is critical. In this study, the models are trained for window
sizes 5, 10, and 15. A minimum window size of 3 is required to distinguish between
a Good TCP SYN and a Bad TCP SYN. The flow for a successful TCP handshake
and SYN Flood demonstrates that the first two packets would be insufficient for the
model to determine whether an attack is underway.
We can predict which packets the model will predict incorrectly based on the
window size even before training the model. The model is still determining the flow of
packets at the start of the dataset, and it will take a few batch processes to understand
the pattern. Another point at which the model may produce an incorrect result is
when switching from benign to malicious packets and vice versa. If the window size is
large, the model may predict incorrectly because the look-back window is too large.
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3.7 Gated Recurrent Unit Network
Figure 3.17: Gated Recurrent Unit Model
PseudoCode
1. Algorithm: GRU
2. FEATURES: Raw Hex values from the packets header in the
network traffic
3. CLASSES: Based on the combination of TCP flags
4. CREATING SAMPLES USING THE WINDOW SIZE ’n’
5. DEFINE TRAIN AND TEST DATASETS
6.GRU MODEL - SEQUENTIAL MODEL DEFINED
7. COMPILE AND FIT THE MODEL




Figure 3.18: GRU Sequential Code
In Mean Square Error loss function, eq 3.3, the difference between the predictions
and the ground truths are squared and averaged across the entire dataset. The
squaring of errors makes sure that the MSE is never negative. With low-dimensional
data, Euclidean Distance produces good results. For many machine learning issues,
methods such as KNN and HDBSCAN have demonstrated efficient performance and






(yi − ȳi)2 (3.3)
The MSE is useful for ensuring that our trained model does not contain any
outlier predictions with significant mistakes, as the squaring element of the function
gives these errors more weight.
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3.8 Convolutional Neural Network+Long Short Term Mem-
ory
Figure 3.19: CNN + LSTM Model
Figure 3.20: CNN + LSTM Sequential Code
PseudoCode
1. Algorithm: CNN + LSTM
2. FEATURES: Raw Hex values from the packets header in the
network traffic
3. CLASSES: Based on the combination of TCP flags
4. CREATING SAMPLES USING THE WINDOW SIZE ’n’
5. DEFINE TRAIN AND TEST DATASETS
6. CNN + LSTM MODEL - SEQUENTIAL MODEL DEFINED
7. COMPILE AND FIT THE MODEL




The convolution layer helps in extracting features from the data sample. RELU
layer converts the data into a non-linear form and passes it into the pooling layer.
The pooling layer removes the redundant features and makes the model invariant
to translation rotation and scaling. The output from this layer is passed into the
LSTM layer. The LSTM layer helps remember data from the previous timesteps.
and dropout helps the model making it more robust to noise
The level of uncertainty offered by the variable to create the desired results is
defined as entropy. A mathematical representation for entropy where the probability






p(x)logp(x), if X is continuous∑
x p(x)logp(x), if X is discrete
(3.4)
Each of the projected probabilities as compared to the actual class output, which
might be either 0 or 1. The eq 3.5 shows that it is the average of N points. The reason
for adopting the log value is that it has a lower penalty for modest variations between
predicted and corrected probabilities. The penalty will be bigger if the discrepancy
is considerable. The use of negative logs on the probabilities is known as ”cross-
entropy”, and since the labels are binary the loss function gets its name ”Binary
Cross Entropy” loss function.




(yi ∗ log(pi) + (1− yi) ∗ log(1− pi)) (3.5)
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3.9 Label Propagation: Semi-Supervised Learning
Figure 3.21: Label Propagation
PseudoCode
1. Algorithm: Label Propagation
2. FEATURES: Raw Hex values from the packets header in the
network traffic
3. CLASSES: Based on the combination of TCP flags
4. CREATING SAMPLES USING THE WINDOW SIZE ’n’
5. DEFINE TRAIN AND TEST DATASETS: 25% Labeled, 50% unla-
beled and 25% testing dataset
6.Label Propagation Model with knn kernel and number of neigh-
bours ’7’
7. COMPILE AND FIT THE MODEL
8. TEST THE MODEL AND CALCULATE ACCURACY, PRECISION, AND F1
SCORE
The number of neighbors used in the knn kernel is defined to ’7’, and the number
of iterations for the labels to propagate is set to ’10’. If all the unlabeled nodes
obtain labels through the graph propagation, the model would stop before reaching
the number of iteration. The convergence threshold, ”tol”, which is the threshold for




In a real-time environment, implementing these models on a router will aid in the
faster and more efficient detection of attacks. With the rise in Software Defined
Networks, computing these algorithms with the advantage of discrete data plane and
control plane would be considered as a method to deploy these models in real-time.
The benefits of such deployment would be
• Reduce latency since the routers are available in every household and act as an
entry point for outside data
• Routers are intelligent, and with modern automation tools, network rules based
on model decisions can be implemented.
• It is possible to optimize bandwidth and computing power. Android, iOS,
and Linux are now supported by Tensorflow Lite and other machine learning
frameworks.
Machine learning algorithms have lately acquired appeal on edge devices such as




All the models are analyzed by calculating the accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score
and the area under the curve (AUC). The outcomes are separated into categories
based on the algorithms and datasets used to train the models.
Figure 4.1: Confusion Matrix
With the help of fig 4.1, the formulas to calculate these parameters are as follows,
Accuracy =
TruePositive+ TrueNegative
















This section consists of the results from the Gated Recurrent Units models. These
models are tested on all three types, Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3, of approaches as
discussed before.
The model was trained for 20 epochs, and the testing datasets are snippets pre-
pared similarly with the docker infrastructure. The Type 1 approach’s Receiver Op-
erating Characteristic (ROC) curves are presented for better understanding.
4.1.1 u700 dataset
Fig 4.2 shows the ROC curve for the GRU model with the Type 1 approach which
eliminates the lexical features like IP addresses, MAC addresses and port numbers.
Figure 4.2: ROC curve for u700 GRU Type 1 - window size = 5
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Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.7970 0.7793 0.7801
Precision 0.8093 0.8095 0.8093
Recall 0.8043 0.8094 0.8096
F1 Score 0.8094 0.8099 0.8095
AUC 0.795 0.793 0.788
Table 4.1: Results for u700 GRU - window size = 5
The table 4.1,shows that when all types are compared with a look-back win-
dow size of 5, they all perform well. Obtaining accuracy of better than 50% for
all approaches is a crucial element when evaluating the dollar-neutral strategy as it
demonstrates that these models may be used to predict DoS attacks in real-time.
Even with the lexical features deleted, Type 1 accuracy is slightly higher than the
other types, indicating that pattern following is better suited to such a dataset with
a smaller look-back window size than knowing the lexical information.
Fig 4.3 shows the ROC curve for the model with the Type 1 approach and look-
back window size increased to 10
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Figure 4.3: ROC curve for u700 GRU Type 1 - window size = 10
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.7359 0.7358 0.7363
Precision 0.7719 0.7719 0.7719
Recall 0.7720 0.7715 0.7720
F1 Score 0.7720 0.7715 0.7720
AUC 0.755 0.763 0.758
Table 4.2: Results for u700 GRU - window size = 10
From table 4.2, the accuracy for type 3 is slightly higher than the other type,
whereas the AUC is higher for type 2. The increased look-back window size enumer-
ates that the model performs better with the knowledge of the lexical features, but
the improvement is relatively minor.
Fig 4.4 shows the ROC curve for the model with the Type 1 approach and look-
back window size increased to 15.
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Figure 4.4: ROC curve for u700 GRU Type 1 - window size = 15
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.7037 0.7037 0.7039
Precision 0.7449 0.7440 0.7740
Recall 0.7442 0.7442 0.7442
F1 Score 0.7441 0.7441 0.7441
AUC 0.741 0.736 0.740
Table 4.3: Results for u700 GRU - window size = 15
From table 4.3, we conclude that the performance of all the types are almost the





Accuracy 0.7970 0.7359 0.7037
Precision 0.8093 0.7719 0.7449
Recall 0.8043 0.7720 0.7442
F1 Score 0.8094 0.7720 0.7441
AUC 0.795 0.755 0.741
Table 4.4: Comparing u700 GRU Type 1 for varying look-back window sizes
Comparing Type 1 approach for varying look-back window size shown in table
4.4, depicts that GRU model performs better in a u700 dataset for smaller look-back
window size. Accuracy drops 11.7% comparing window size 5 and window size 15
results. u700 dataset has higher rate of DoS attack and having a larger look-back
window size performs poorer as any benign traffic that appears between a majority




Figure 4.5: ROC curve for u800 GRU Type 1 - window size = 5
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.8167 0.8143 0.8169
Precision 0.8215 0.8202 0.8215
Recall 0.8210 0.8183 0.8215
F1 Score 0.8210 0.8183 0.8215
AUC 0.835 0.832 0.835
Table 4.5: Results for u800 GRU - window size = 5
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Figure 4.6: ROC curve for u800 Type 1 - window size = 10
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.8095 0.8090 0.8095
Precision 0.8144 0.8142 0.8144
Recall 0.8145 0.8145 0.8145
F1 Score 0.8144 0.8144 0.8144
AUC 0.829 0.829 0.829
Table 4.6: Results for u800 GRU - window size = 10
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Figure 4.7: ROC curve for u800 Type 1 - window size = 15
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.8013 0.8016 0.8016
Precision 0.8064 0.8064 0.8066
Recall 0.8065 0.8065 0.8065
F1 Score 0.8065 0.8065 0.8065
AUC 0.821 0.820 0.815
Table 4.7: Results for u800 GRU - window size = 15
From the table 4.5, table 4.6 and table 4.7 comparing the outcomes for different
approaches to different look-back window sizes, the figures show that knowing lexical
characteristics doesn’t help in getting better results. When comparing the results
from the u700 dataset to the u800 dataset, it appears that the u800 dataset has





Accuracy 0.8167 0.8095 0.8013
Precision 0.8215 0.8144 0.8064
Recall 0.8210 0.8145 0.8065
F1 Score 0.8210 0.8144 0.8065
AUC 0.835 0.829 0.821
Table 4.8: Comparing u800 GRU Type 1 for varying look-back window sizes
Table 4.8 attests that for the Type 1 approach, the accuracy for look-back window
size 15 drops by 1.88 % to the accuracy with window size 5. The AUC score has also
dropped by 0.014. Though the difference in findings is minor, they support the idea





Fig 4.8 shows the ROC curve for Type 1 approach on a GRU model with u1000 as
the training dataset.
Figure 4.8: ROC curve for u1000 GRU Type 1 - window size = 5
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.7436 0.7432 0.7412
Precision 0.7436 0.7433 0.7427
Recall 1.0 0.9693 0.9944
F1 Score 0.8530 0.8529 0.8529
AUC 0.642 0.638 0.639
Table 4.9: Results for u1000 GRU - window size = 5
Fig 4.9 shows the ROC curve for Type 1 approach on a GRU model with u1000
as the training dataset with look-back window size ”10”.
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Figure 4.9: ROC curve for u1000 GRU Type 1 - window size = 10
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.7359 0.7341 0.7357
Precision 0.7754 0.7813 0.7751
Recall 0.9078 0.8922 0.9060
F1 Score 0.8364 0.8331 0.8360
AUC 0.656 0.652 0.654
Table 4.10: Results for u1000 GRU - window size = 10
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Figure 4.10: ROC curve for u1000 GRU Type 1 - window size = 15
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.7279 0.7277 0.7316
Precision 0.7710 0.7710 0.7655
Recall 0.9027 0.9018 0.9211
F1 Score 0.8315 0.8312 0.8362
AUC 0.641 0.641 0.643
Table 4.11: Results for u1000 GRU - window size = 15
Combining the Type 1 values for all window sizes from Table 4.9, Table 4.9 and
Table 4.11, In comparison to previous findings for other datasets, the model does
not perform well. The explanation for this might be that the sluggish rate of attack
necessitates a larger look-back window size. In table 4.12 Recall of ”1” shows that





Accuracy 0.7436 0.7359 0.7279
Precision 0.7436 0.7754 0.7710
Recall 1.0 0.9078 0.9027
F1 Score 0.8530 0.8364 0.8315
AUC 0.642 0.656 0.641




This section consists of the results from the combination of Convolutional Neural
Network and Long Short Term Memory model. These models are tested on all three
types, Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3, of approaches as discussed before.
The model was trained for 20 epochs, and the testing datasets are being prepared
similarly with Docker infrastructure.
4.2.1 u700 dataset
Fig 4.11 shows the ROC curve for Type 1 approach on a combination of CNN and
LSTM model with u700 as the training dataset.
Figure 4.11: ROC curve for u700 CNN/LSTM Type 1 - window size = 5
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Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.9060 0.9078 0.9065
Precision 0.8938 0.9045 0.9046
Recall 0.9507 0.9401 0.9373
F1 Score 0.9214 0.9219 0.9207
AUC 0.955 0.954 0.952
Table 4.13: Results for u700 CNN/LSTM - window size = 5
For a look-back window size of 5, Table 4.13 compares the model’s output with
the three types employed in this study.The spatial coherence of the input is taken into
consideration by CNN, and it can detect the key characteristics. The accuracy of the
models show an increasing trend as we add the lexical features to the input features.
When compared to Type 1, Type 2’s accuracy rose by 0.018. Even though the model
accuracy is higher for later types, Even though the model accuracy is higher for later
types, the AUC demonstrates that the Type 1 model performs better when other
metrics such as Recall and F1 Score are taken into account.
Figure 4.12: ROC curve for u700 CNN/LSTM Type 1 - window size = 10
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Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.9075 0.9072 0.9078
Precision 0.8976 0.8994 0.9050
Recall 0.9484 0.9454 0.9393
F1 Score 0.9223 0.9218 0.9219
AUC 0.956 0.956 0.955
Table 4.14: Results for u700 CNN/LSTM - window size = 10
From Fig 4.12 and Table 4.14, the model comparison for a look-back window
size 10 shows that all the model performs likewise with 93.04% average accuracy of
these models. The pattern of the incoming network traffic is predicted imperceptibly
better for Type 1 shown by the AUC score of 0.974 in fig 4.12. Knowledge of the IP
addresses, MAC addresses, and port numbers didn’t assist much with the results and
increased the time required to complete the model analysis.
Figure 4.13: ROC curve for u700 CNN/LSTM Type 1 - window size = 15
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Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.9116 0.9060 0.9079
Precision 0.9075 0.8969 0.9047
Recall 0.9435 0.9464 0.9400
F1 Score 0.9252 0.9210 0.9220
AUC 0.960 0.953 0.954
Table 4.15: Results for u700 CNN/LSTM - window size = 15
Fig 4.13 and Table 4.15 show the results for look-back window size 15 in a
CNN/LSTM model for different types. A similar trend is observed, the accuracy ob-
tained differ by 0.0009 between the three types, with an average accuracy of 97.5%.
The CNN/LSTM models performed extremely well for a high rate DoS attack for all
the look-back window sizes studied in this research.
Window Sizes
5 10 15
Accuracy 0.9060 0.9075 0.9116
Precision 0.8938 0.8976 0.9075
Recall 0.9507 0.9484 0.9435
F1 Score 0.9214 0.9223 0.9252
AUC 0.955 0.956 0.960
Table 4.16: Comparing u700 CNN/LSTM Type 1 for varying look-back window sizes
Comparing the Type 1 approach for varying look-back window size shown in Table
4.16, depicts that CNN/LSTM model performs slightly better in a u700 dataset for
bigger look-back window size. Accuracy increases by 0.0006 comparing window sizes
5 and 15 results. AUC also increases by 0.009 for window size 15. Though the findings
differ by minute amount, the impact of the larger window size and CNN’s ability to
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assign greater weight to crucial traits can be plainly seen.
4.2.2 u800 dataset
Figure 4.14: ROC curve for u800 CNN/LSTM Type 1 - window size = 5
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.9302 0.9298 0.9300
Precision 0.9045 0.9037 0.9035
Recall 0.9659 0.9661 0.9670
F1 Score 0.9342 0.9339 0.9341
AUC 0.967 0.966 0.966
Table 4.17: Results for u800 CNN/LSTM - window size = 5
Fig 4.14 shows the ROC curve for u800 Type 1 with the look-back window size ”5”.
Type 1 performs extremely well with the AUC score of 0.967 also show in table 4.17
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Figure 4.15: ROC curve for u800 Type 1 - window size = 10
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.9306 0.9304 0.9302
Precision 0.9067 0.9044 0.9062
Recall 0.9639 0.9666 0.9637
F1 Score 0.9344 0.9345 0.9341
AUC 0.974 0.972 0.972
Table 4.18: Results for u800 CNN/LSTM - window size = 10
Fig 4.15 shows the ROC curve for u800 Type 1 with the look-back window size
10. The accuracy drops just below 90% for Type 1 but comparing to the other types
it still performs at par without the important lexical features as shown in table 4.18
70
Chapter 4. Results
Figure 4.16: ROC curve for u800 CNN/LSTM Type 1 - window size = 15
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.9308 0.9304 0.9297
Precision 0.9074 0.9048 0.9029
Recall 0.9635 0.9661 0.9669
F1 Score 0.9346 0.9345 0.9338
AUC 0.975 0.975 0.974
Table 4.19: Results for u800 CNN/LSTM - window size = 15
Fig 4.16 shows the ROC curve for u800 Type 1 with the look-back window size
10. The accuracy for type 1 is higher by 0.002 than the type 3. Also, the AUC score





Accuracy 0.9302 0.9306 0.9308
Precision 0.9045 0.9067 0.9074
Recall 0.9659 0.9639 0.9635
F1 Score 0.9342 0.9344 0.9346
AUC 0.967 0.974 0.975
Table 4.20: Comparing u800 CNN/LSTM Type 1 for varying look-back window sizes
Comparing the u800 dataset for Type 1 CNN/LSTM with varying window sizes,
shown in table 4.20, we conclude that the accuracy shows a steep increase with
growing look-back window size. The additional input samples help the CNN provide





Figure 4.17: ROC curve for u1000 CNN/LSTM Type 1 - window size = 5
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.8951 0.8943 0.8945
Precision 0.8964 0.8900 0.8954
Recall 0.9712 0.9787 0.9717
F1 Score 0.9323 0.9323 0.9320
AUC 0.917 0.911 0.910
Table 4.21: Results for u1000 CNN/LSTM - window size = 5
Fig 4.17 and Table 4.21 shows the result for u1000 dataset type 1 with a look-back
window size 5.The results show that as the dataset progresses from type 1 to type 3,
the accuracy and AUC score decline. AUC of more than 90% still offers better results
than the GRU model.
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Figure 4.18: ROC curve for u1000 CNN/LSTM Type 1 - window size = 10
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.8963 0.8959 0.8962
Precision 0.8963 0.8936 0.8960
Recall 0.9731 0.9331 0.9331
F1 Score 0.9331 0.9331 0.9331
AUC 0.924 0.921 0.921
Table 4.22: Results for u1000 CNN/LSTM - window size = 10
Fig 4.18 shows the ROC curve for Type 1 with the look-back window size 10.
Table 4.22 documents the results for all the types discussed before, and the trend of a
minor decline in performance continues for the u1000 dataset as it moves from Type
1 to Type 3.
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Figure 4.19: ROC curve for u1000 CNN/LSTM Type 1 - window size = 15
Fig 4.19 shows the ROC curve for Type 1 with the look-back window size 15 with
the AUC score of 0.933.
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Accuracy 0.8999 0.8986 0.8971
Precision 0.9030 0.9069 0.8945
Recall 0.9695 0.9624 0.9768
F1 Score 0.93514 0.9339 0.9338
AUC 0.933 0.927 0.927





Accuracy 0.8951 0.8963 0.8999
Precision 0.8964 0.8963 0.9030
Recall 0.9712 0.9731 0.9695
F1 Score 0.9323 0.9331 0.9351
AUC 0.917 0.924 0.933
Table 4.24: Comparing u1000 CNN/LSTM Type 1 for varying look-back window sizes
We find that a longer look-back window size gives superior performance when
comparing the Type 1 technique in the u1000 dataset with different window sizes
presented in Table 4.24. Because CNN recognizes the relevant characteristics and
LSTM can recall information for a longer period, the combination of CNN and LSTM




Label Propagation is the semi-supervised technique employed, and the basis is de-
scribed in the research paper [18]. Both of the training datasets utilized in this study
have an impact of a DDoS assault. As previously mentioned, the DDoS6 dataset
features numerous attackers and a bystander who sends a single file, whereas the




Fig 4.20, Fig 4.21 and Fig 4.22 show the ROC curves for the labelled propagation
model for Type 1 approach with the window size 5, 10 and 15 respectively.
Figure 4.20: ROC curve for DDoS6 Label Propagation Type 1 - window size = 5
An almost perfect ROC is obtained using Label Propagation. By using the unique
values threshold and not the probabilities of the predicted class, a 3-point ROC is
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generated. Thus the model can predict discrete predictions.
Figure 4.21: ROC curve for DDoS6 Label Propagation Type 1 - window size = 10





Accuracy 0.9714 0.9676 0.9650
Precision 0.9555 0.9500 0.9519
Recall 0.9636 0.9584 0.9489
F1 Score 0.9595 0.9542 0.9504
AUC 0.970 0.966 0.961
Table 4.25: Comparing DDoS6 Label Propagation Type 1 for varying look-back window
sizes
For all window sizes, the label propagation model has a higher accuracy than
the other models. The model can predict the labels for 50% of the data, 25% data
is labeled, and the remaining 25% is used for testing. High AUC values indicate
that the model fits the unlabeled data well using the existing hyperparameters. This
model takes less time to fit the training data compared to the previous algorithms
mentioned in this research. KNN kernel (knn = 5) is used along with the Euclidean
distance concept for propagating the labels.
4.3.1.2 DDoS7 dataset
Fig 4.20, Fig 4.21 and Fig 4.22 show the ROC curves for the labelled propagation




Figure 4.23: ROC curve for DDoS7 Label Propagation Type 1 - window size = 5
Figure 4.24: ROC curve for DDoS7 Label Propagation Type 1 - window size = 10
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Figure 4.25: ROC curve for DDoS7 Label Propagation Type 1 - window size = 15
Window Sizes
5 10 15
Accuracy 0.9712 0.9684 0.9666
Precision 0.9872 0.9809 0.9722
Recall 0.9503 0.9502 0.9547
F1 Score 0.9684 0.9653 0.9634
AUC 0.970 0.967 0.966
Table 4.26: Comparing DDoS7 Label Propagation Type 1 for varying look-back window
sizes
The results tabulated in table 4.26 show that DDoS7 data which contains multiple
successful TCP 3-way handshakes along with a distributed denial of service attack,
the label propagation is accurately able to propagate labels to unlabelled data. By
eliminating the lexical features, DDoS datasets are indirectly converted to a DoS
dataset and pattern of the incoming traffic flow is observed.
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4.4 Comparing Results for Type 1 across different algorithms
Figure 4.26: Comparision of accuracy in Type 1 approach
If only GRU models are under consideration, all of the models behave similarly, and
logical reasons for the behavior when Type 1 is compared to Type 2 and Type 3 have
already been presented. Comparing both GRU and CNN/LSTM, the results validate
that a combination of CNN and LSTM performs much better than GRU. GRU is
outperformed by CNN’s ability to filter key characteristics and LSTM’s ability to
recall a longer chain of information. GRU works better with less training data, and
its performance speed is faster than LSTM since it only has two primary operational
gates. The figures and numbers indicate that the training dataset has a significant
impact on the outcome since the pattern of the incoming network traffic differs be-
tween datasets. The results for different attack signatures may differ because these
models are based on pattern detection, and network traffic is highly unpredictable.
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Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
For categorizing a Denial of Service attack, the research uses a novel approach to
network traffic anonymization, focusing on the pattern of incoming network traffic
flow rather than the source and destination addresses. This approach considers the
model’s look-back window while predicting the label for an incoming packet. The
model is tuned using a customized dataset and also evaluated with a fragment of
the DARPA 2009 DDoS dataset, yielding an average accuracy of 93.79 percent and
94.82 percent for the Type-1 method GRU and CNN/LSTM, respectively. Because
the model is not dependent on MAC addresses, IP addresses, or Port numbers, the
purpose of adopting the Type-1 technique is to get a generic model that can be ex-
ecuted in real-time on any network traffic, which is a primary aim of this research.
Detecting patterns and abnormalities in the network traffic will be faster, and using
modern automation tools cyber attacks can be isolated with fewer human interven-
tions. The accuracy of the findings achieved on customized created datasets is greater
than 80%, indicating that the technique is reliable and may be used in conjunction
with other cyber threat detection mechanisms.
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5.2 Future Work
Although the focus of this study is on detecting TCP SYN Flood attacks, the novel
approach of removing lexical features and detecting the attack based on the pattern of
incoming network traffic can be applied to other cyberattacks. The Gated Recurrent
Network produces acceptable results, but the CNN/LSTM combination outperforms
them, leaving room for improvement by varying the number of memory layers and
other hyperparameters.
The performance drop for the u1000 dataset raises the issue of the look-back win-
dow size for a low-rate denial of service attack and its impact on recurrent networks’
memory units. The number of features input to the neural network in this study
was 196 hexadecimal characters, but with the help of Principal Component Analysis
(PCA), the number of features input to the neural network can be reduced, reducing
model training time and improving performance.
The scope of this research would include automated solutions for various cy-
berattack detection using packet classification and mitigation in modern Software
Defined Networks. The model will be trained on the signature pattern of the attack
and wouldn’t depend on the lexical features that would aid in implementing it in a
real-time scenario.
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Appendix A: Files related to Docker
This chapter includes the Dockerfile and the dockercompose file to spin-up the infras-
tructure used in the research in a Docker environment.
A.1 Dockerfile
FROM ubuntu:latest
# Set environment variables.
ENV HOME /root
# Define working directory.
WORKDIR /root
# Define default command.
CMD [”/bin/bash”]












RUN echo ”Prerequisites installed”
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command: tail -f /dev/null
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Appendix B: Python Files
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